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Introduction 
Histories of the tumultuous early years of the US patent system 
have focused on “courts and parties.”1 Congress, using its constitutional 
authority to “promote the [p]rogress of . . . useful [a]rts,” passed three 
patent acts in rapid succession.2 To understand the transition from the 
practices of colonial North America to the world’s first modern patent 
system, intellectual histories focusing on legislation and judicial 
opinions, as well as their interpretation by contemporary politicians and 
legal thinkers, have been invaluable.3 There was a third site of 
 
†  Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of History, Northeastern University, 
Boston, MA. B.S., Yale University; M.A./J.D., University of California-
Berkeley; Ph.D., Harvard University. k.swanson@northeastern.edu.  Many 
thanks to the organizers and participants in The Rise of Intellectual Property 
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Classical Liberal Institute, 
NYU School of Law, held virtually, summer 2020, for comments and 
suggestions, and to Jed Shugerman, Sanford Levinson and participants in 
the Law & Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop, Georgetown University 
School of Law, 2013, for comments on an earlier version. 
1. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The 
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920, at 24 
(1982) (describing early republic as a “state of courts and parties”).  
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The three statutory schemes were those created 
by the Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); the Patent 
Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); and the Patent Act of 
1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
3. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins 
of American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 12–31, 47–53, 
188–306 (2016) [hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas]; Edward C. 
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: 
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contestation, however. The patent clerk in his daily actions, imple–
menting changing legislative mandates, was also influencing how 
Americans understood patents.4 As Woodrow Wilson noted over one 
hundred years ago, scholars and political theorists have long put aside 
“as ‘practical detail’ which clerks could arrange” the question of “how 
law should be administered with enlightenment, with equity, with 
speed, and without friction.”5 This Essay focuses on patent bureaucrats 
 
American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (1998); Oren 
Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents 
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 177 
(2004) [hereinafter Bracha, Commodification]; Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263 
(2016); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 
28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 45 (2013); B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights 
and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. Econ. 
Hist. 58 (1995); Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent 
Law, 32 Tech. & Culture 932 (1991); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent 
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953 (2007); Adam 
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689, 
(2007); Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American 
Patent Law, 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 254 (1961); Frank D. Prager, Historic 
Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 Am. J. Legal 
Hist. 309 (1961); Frank D. Prager, Trends and Developments in 
American Patent Law from Jefferson to Clifford (1790–1870), Part II, 6 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 45 (1962). 
4. I use “his” deliberately, as the actors I discuss during this time period 
were all male, although William Thornton, patent clerk in the early 
nineteenth century, drafted his wife, Anna Maria, to help him with patent 
copying duties and women also worked as copyists in the Patent Office in 
the 1850s. Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S. 
Patent Office, 1790–1836, 5 J. Early Republic 331, 336 (1985) (noting 
Mrs. Thornton’s participation); Kara W. Swanson, Rubbing Elbows and 
Blowing Smoke: Gender, Class, and Science in the Nineteenth-Century 
Patent Office, 108 Isis 40, 45–46, 48, 51 (2017). The participants were 
also all white. Kenneth W. Dobyns, The Patent Office Pony: A 
History of the Early Patent Office 234 (2d ed. 2016) (identifying 
the first possible Black clerical employee of patent office in 1870). Note 
that while concentrating on the intellectual history of the patent system, 
Bracha also agrees the patent system involves more than law and policy 
decisions. Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 182; see also Robert 
Burrell & Catherine Kelly, Parliamentary Rewards and the Evolution of 
the Patent System, 74 Cambridge L.J. 423, 449 (2015) (noting the 
significance of bureaucrats (“law officers”) in the development of UK 
patent law before 1830). For a similar emphasis on administration, see 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: 
The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 
6 and passim (2012). 
5. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 197, 198–
99 (1887); see also Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira 
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and the practical details they arranged.6 In processing patent applica–
tions, they were required to interpret the law. Their decisions frequently 
raised questions of “equity,” leading to considerable “friction.”7 In their 
paper-shuffling, patent bureaucrats materialized political theory.8 Daily 
procedure translated high-order questions about the nature and purpose 
of patents into mundane controversies about application processing and 
civil service hiring. 
The relationship between patent applicants and the government, 
and thus the nature of patents themselves as the product of that 
relationship, was enacted in the making of patents, practical detail by 
practical detail. In the first decades of the US patent system, there was 
a widely acknowledged shift from patents as privileges to patents as 
rights, as the relationship between the inventor and the state changed 
in law and political theory.9 What began in early modern Europe and 
 
Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in Addresses of Charles Evans 
Hughes, 1906–1916, at 186 (2d ed. 1916) (distinguishing administrative 
“matters of detail” from “real” judicial questions) (as quoted by Daniel 
R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State 
Emerges in America, 1900–1940, at 29 (2014)). 
6. For the historiography of the patent clerk and the Patent Office, see generally 
Robert C. Post, Physics, Patents and Politics: A Biography of 
Charles Grafton Page 42–61, 108–64 (1976) [hereinafter Post, 
Physics, Patents and Politics] (discussing the experiences of Charles 
Page, as patent examiner and patent agent in the broader context of the mid-
nineteenth-century patent office); Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” Versus 
“Scientific Men” in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 Tech. & Culture 
(1976) [hereinafter Post, “Liberalizers”] (discussing the competing philo–
sophies of “liberalizers” and “scientific men” in the mid-century Patent 
Office); Dobyns, supra note 4 (providing a history of the first century of the 
Patent Office); P.J. FEDERICO, ed., OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES PATENT OFFICE (1936)(reprint of July 1936 number of the J. Pat. 
Off. Soc’y); Preston, supra note 4 (discussing patent administration from 
1790–1836). 
7. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 198–99. 
8. Cf. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in 
the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 775–76 (1994) 
(arguing that executive officers interpret the Constitution through daily 
actions); Mashaw, supra note 4, at 16 (focusing on administrative action 
rather than legislative or judicial actions). 
9. See, e.g., Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 180–81, passim 
(explaining transition from privilege to right). See also Bracha, Owning 
Ideas, supra note 3, at 5, 11; Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical 
Context, supra note 3, at 967–68 (focusing on the US patent system and 
interpreting it in context of British precedents). Cf. Sean Bottomley, 
The British Patent System During the Industrial Revolution 
1700–1852: From Privilege to Property, at 20–23, passim (2014) 
(interpreting British patent history in this period as transition from 
patents as privileges to property); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American 
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colonial America as a discretionary privilege granted by a sovereign 
became an application as of right in the United States.10 How patent 
administrators performed their role crucially contributed to what 
patents were. The changing patent laws mandated different levels of 
administrative discretion. In arranging the practical details of patent 
processing, bureaucrats both narrowed and enlarged the scope of their 
statutory discretion, thereby making patents more or less like privileges 
or rights. Further, as they exercised discretion, administrators enacted 
their understanding of the purpose of patents, choosing to emphasize 
the public benefit which might flow from this means of encouraging new 
technologies, or the private concerns of inventors, seeking maximum 
economic return. With recognition of their power to shape the nature 
and purpose of patents came controversy about the best men for the 
job. Was making patents a job for copyists or cabinet officials?  
Considering these questions brings us to a clerk’s eye view of the 
patent system, a level at which personal inclinations and practical 
considerations mattered more than declarations of Congress and courts, 
which often became certain only in retrospect.11 In the muddy reality 
of daily work, patent processing refused to fit neatly into an orderly 
narrative of transformation from privilege to right, guided by the 
constitutionally mandated purpose to “promote the [p]rogress of . . . 
useful [a]rts.”12 Grand claims of social benefit and individual rights 
dissipated in countless bureaucratic decisions.13 Reliance on ex ante 
bureaucratic review and ex post critique in courts and the marketplace 
seesawed back and forth depending on the legislative regime and the 
actions of the administrators. Bureaucrats, wanting to get the job done, 
 
Administrative Law: Federalism Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1263 (describing how “administration projects state power”).  
10. Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing 
Rights and Authors, 73 Soc. Rsch. 1129, 1129 (2006); Bracha, Owning 
Ideas, supra note 3, at 6, 188–89; Bottomley, supra note 9, at 103; see 
also B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents 
and Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790–1920, 
at 2 (2005) (arguing the US patent law was suffused from the outset with 
anti-privilege ideas). 
11. See, e.g., Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 227–30 (demonstrating 
that Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850) now seen as a turning 
point in the development of nonobviousness doctrine, did not become so 
until later); Kara W. Swanson, Race, Gender, and the True Inventor (work 
in progress presented virtually at Working with Intellectual Property: Legal 
Histories of Innovation, Labor, and Creativity, Stanford Center for Law and 
History, Stanford Law School, spring 2021) (arguing that meaning of “true 
inventor” as enacted into patent laws in 1790, 1793 and 1836 did not become 
certain until the end of the nineteenth century). 
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13.  Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 304–06. 
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responded to the immediate pressures of applicants, colleagues, and 
superiors.14 
In the twenty-first century, the nature and purpose of patents 
remains consequentially contested, in high stakes debates tied to the 
interpretation of their early history.15 This Essay argues that in order 
for twenty-first-century scholars to evaluate these debates and fully 
understand the antebellum patent system, we need to understand how 
antebellum patent bureaucrats made patents. Our histories of the 
patent system need to include the clerk.  
While not offering a full history of seventy years of patent 
administration, this Essay analyzes US patent making under the three 
legislative regimes of the antebellum period. I first question dominant 
assumptions about the early patent board (1790–93) as highly discre–
tionary and public-oriented, and then review the considerable power 
William Thornton wielded between 1802 and 1828 to shape the patent 
system in service of inventors, despite the formal absence of any 
discretion to do so, before turning to the first decades of the modern 
examination system (1836–60), when debates raged about who should 
fill the new patent examiner positions. In each era, I consider who was 
processing patent applications and how, arguing that such details 
shaped public perceptions about the nature and purpose of patents. In 
 
14. Contemporary studies have demonstrated such pressures and analyzed 
them as a form of regulatory capture. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh 
Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent 
System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to 
Do About It 136 (2004) (discussing examiners under pressure to “‘go easy’ 
on applicants and allow their patents to be granted”); Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can 
Solve It 22–24 (2009) (arguing that PTO suffers from capture by patent 
applicants); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics 
and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 817, 817, 826 (2012) 
(identifying different groups of examiners with different responses to agency 
and applicant pressures); Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical 
Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 10, at 2 
(2012) (same). For a recent review of contemporary empirical literature of 
patent examiner behavior, see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, 
Empirical Scholarship on the Prosecution Process at the USPTO, in 
Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property 
Law 77 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 2019). 
15. Compare Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 
S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (finding that patents are public rights and therefore 
that administrative post-grant review of patents does not violate Article 
III), with Adam Mossoff, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and the Mistaken 
Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 2591, 2593–
94 (2019) (arguing that Oil States was incorrectly decided based on a 
misunderstanding of history), and N. Scott Pierce, Double Jeopardy: 
Patents of Invention as Contracts, Invention Disclosure as Consideration, 
and Where Oil States Went Wrong, 30 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media 
& Ent. L.J. 645, 649–51 (2020) (same). 
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conclusion, I draw some suggestions from this initial survey of US 
patent administration both for our historical understanding of patents 
and contemporary critiques of the Patent Office, reminding us of the 
power of clerks. 
I. Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Board, 1790–93 
The Patent Office has long proudly claimed Thomas Jefferson as 
the first patent bureaucrat.16 As Secretary of State in President George 
Washington’s first administration, Jefferson acted, along with Secretary 
of War Henry Knox and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, as part 
of a three-person “patent board,” pursuant to the Patent Act of 1790.17 
To obtain exclusive rights for up to fourteen years to make, use, and 
sell an inventive idea “not before known or used,” “any person” could 
submit a petition to these three men.18 If at least two of them found 
the invention “sufficiently useful and important,” the board was to 
“cause letters patent to be made out.”19 If a patent was obtained 
“surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion,” a district court judge had 
the power to repeal it, but the Act made no provision for appeal from 
a refusal to grant a petition.20  
This mandate to judge not only novelty but also whether an 
invention was “sufficiently useful and important,” combined with the 
lack of recourse if a petition were denied, created a process similar to 
that by which petitioners had sought patents from the British crown 
and from colonial governments.21 As in these systems, no petitioner, 
 
16. As part of the Centennial Celebration of the patent system, the Patent 
Office Society, the organization of patent clerks, dedicated a bust of Thomas 
Jefferson, claiming him as the first “Commissioner of Patents.” E. F. Klinge, 
Address at the Dedication Ceremony of the Bust of Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 
23, 1936), in Nat’l Comm. on Centennial Celebration of the Am. 
Pat. Sys., Centennial Celebration of the American Patent 
System 28–29 (1937). 
17. P. J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 
237, 237–38 (1936).  
18. Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–110 (1790). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. § 5; see Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 Vand. L. 
Rev. 647, 663–67 (2019) (discussing repeal power). 
21. For a discussion of the origins and slow formalization of the British system, 
see Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The 
English Patent System, 1660–1800, at 2–3 and passim (Cambridge Univ. 
Press ed., 1988); Bottomley, supra note 9, at 36-39 (noting changes 
between 1535 and 1852); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 15–25. 
For previous colonial practice and state patents, see Bruce W. Bugbee, 
The Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 60–103 (1967); 
Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 25–31; P. J. Federico, State 
Patents, 13 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 166, 166–76 (1931); P. J. Federico, Colonial 
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however inventive, had an enforceable right to a patent grant, making 
it akin to a royal privilege, granted at the “grace and favour” of the 
monarch.22 The small committee of unelected executive branch officers 
replaced the legislature, which, in earlier colonial and state patent 
processes, had considered petitions and granted patents by private bills. 
While American inventors had filed patent petitions with Congress 
seeking to continue this earlier approach, Congress refused to exercise 
its delegated power by granting patents directly.23  
Instead, by designating the Secretaries of State and War as patent 
administrators, Congress had assigned the heads of two of only three 
executive departments to the task of processing patent petitions.24 Due 
to their government positions, between them, Jefferson and Knox had 
a comprehensive understanding of domestic and foreign affairs. The 
third board member, Attorney General Randolph, was the govern–
ment’s legal advisor and also had the duty of examining each patent, 
once “made out,” for conformity to the statute.25 Like the monarch, 
these men sat at the center of power as they made their judgment about 
what was “sufficiently useful and important,” with the ability to 
consider all national priorities.26 They also were not directly responsible 
to the people or their representatives, as they were appointed by the 
president. These elite men, what President Washington called “first 
characters of the Union,” read each application and made unreviewable 
decisions.27  
 
Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 358, 358–64 (1929); Hrdy, 
supra note 3, at 58–60. 
22. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 22 (citing W. M. Hindmarch, 
A Treatise on the Law Relative to Patent Privileges for the 
Sole Use of Inventions 3–4 (1846)). While explaining these similarities 
in greater detail, Bracha also notes that US patents of this period differed 
from prior colonial and British patents in that they were “universalized 
privilege[s],” as the statutory guidance offered a new standardization of 
the entitlements to be granted. Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, 
at 219, 222. 
23. Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 37, 81–87, 107–08, 115–20. 
24. The third department was Treasury. Leonard D. White, The Feder–
alists: A Study in Administrative History 26 (1948). Cf. Mashaw, 
supra note 9, at 1286–87 (arguing that Treasury was not an executive 
department). 
25. Patent Act of 1790 § 1; Mashaw, supra note 9, at 1289–90 (describing role 
of Attorney General).  
26. Patent Act of 1790 § 1. 
27. “From George Washington to James Madison, 23 September 1789,” 
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-04-02-0046 [Original source: The Papers of 
George Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 4, 8 September 1789 – 15 
January 1790, ed. Dorothy Twohig. Charlottesville: University Press of 
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From their privileged position, these men made patent grants based 
on their understanding of the public good.28 Surviving records indicate 
that Jefferson, himself an inventor, took the lead in patent 
administration duties.29 As Jefferson described his work decades later, 
he examined patent applications “[c]onsidering the exclusive right to 
invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society.”30 
Petition by petition, board members, led by Jefferson, learned about 
new technologies that might be useful to the new nation and then were 
directed to select only those sufficiently important and useful for a 
patent grant.31  
It is this combination of factors, that is, lack of review from denial 
and examination by elite men charged with promoting social benefit on 
a national scale, that has led both scholars and participants to 
 
Virginia, 1993, pp. 67–68] (describing type of men sought for judicial 
appointments); see also Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A 
Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829, at 258–63, 267–69, 508 
(1951) (describing general approach to appointments by Presidents 
Washington and Adams). 
28. See Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 181 (arguing that patents 
of this era fulfilled “individually defined public purposes”). 
29. Memorandum Book of the Office of the Secretary of Congress, 1785–88, and 
of the Department of State, 1789–1795, microformed on Papers of the 
Continental Congress, 1774–1779, Microscopy No. 247, Roll 198, Item 187 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications), at 49–76 (recording that only 
Jefferson and Knox attended periodic meetings between April 17, 1790 and 
July 9, 1790); Keith Thomson, Jefferson’s Shadow: The Story of 
His Science 165-75 (2012) (Jefferson’s inventions); see also 
Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 179-83; Federico, supra note 17, at 238.  
30. “From Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813,” Founders 
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 6, 11 March to 27 November 1813, ed. 
J. Jefferson Looney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 379–
386] (recollecting twenty years later); see also Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent 
“Privilege” in Historical Context, supra note 3, at 955 (arguing that 
Jefferson’s reminiscences are frequently misread and overemphasized); 
Christopher Beauchamp, Oliver Evans and the Framing of American 
Patent Law, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1, 468–71 (2020) (setting 
Jefferson’s letter in context of Oliver Evan’s patent litigation). 
31. For Jefferson’s lifelong engagement with technology and its links to his 
political philosophy, see, for example, Hugo A. Meier, Thomas Jefferson 
and a Democratic Technology, in Technology in America: A History 
of Individuals and Ideas 17–33 (Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
How elite Americans thought about the role of manufactures, and thus 
labor-saving technology, varied. Jefferson’s views sharply diverged from 
those of Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of Treasury. Walterscheid, 
supra note 3, at 147–48, 155. 
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characterize early US patents as privileges.32 The ability to monetize an 
inventive idea through a federal grant that could be licensed and 
assigned was not a right granted to inventors by Congress, but rather 
a privilege that might be bestowed or withheld in the unreviewable 
discretion of bureaucrats. This privilege model was replaced during the 
nineteenth century by the current system in which inventors seek 
patents with an expectation of a grant if they meet the legal criteria of 
a patentable invention and with a robust appeal process available if 
their application is denied, changing patents into rights.33 
While others have debated the endpoint of that shift—arguing, for 
example, that the creation of a statutory right to appeal a denial, while 
important, did not destroy all vestiges of a privilege-based under–
standing of the nature and purpose of patents34—I focus on the actions 
of Jefferson and his fellow patent bureaucrats to understand its 
beginnings, arguing that their practices of making patents during this 
early period made patents less privilege-like and more rights-like than 
the statutory language suggests.  
The limited information available indicates that the board granted 
less than half of patent petitions, a much lower rate than under later 
statutory regimes.35 In their approach to making patents, these admin–
istrators apparently set a high bar when measuring patent petitions 
against the purposes of the patent system, seeking to serve the interests 
of a new nation as interpreted by its most influential members. Yet 
there are hints that Jefferson and his colleagues, faced with the practical 
problem of processing petitions, quickly began to develop practices 
 
32. For scholarship, see, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9–10. For participants, 
see Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 196–201 (noting how patent 
petitioners in this period acted as though they were seeking privileges). 
Note that these two aspects of privilege—unreviewable discretion and 
decision-making by elites—need not go hand-in-hand. There is also a third 
aspect of patents-as-privileges: they might be most easily obtained by 
those who themselves had privilege, in the sense of social capital and 
economic resources. In eighteenth-century England, for example, patents 
involved “an astute game of patronage.” Bottomley, supra note 9, at 
43. As I suggest infra in text accompanying notes 44–46, meeting the 
Board’s requests would have required resources that might have been 
beyond inventors who were not themselves wealthy or who lacked wealthy 
backers. 
33. See generally U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (2020) (providing detailed rules for patent 
examination and intra-agency review of denials). See also Bracha, Owning 
Ideas, supra note 3, at 3–4.  
34. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 215. 
35. About fifty-seven patents were issued under the Patent Act of 1790. 
Federico, supra note 17, at 244, 246 (noting that at least 114 applications 
were filed in 1790 and 1791 alone); see also Dumas Malone, Jefferson 
and the Rights of Man 283 (1951). 
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nudging the discretionary privilege model of patents toward something 
more like rights.36 
Because the patent board was operational for fewer than three years 
and because few records survive, hints are all that remain.37 But we 
need to consider the possibility that in an uncountable number of cases, 
the board denied patent petitions for reasons unrelated to its 
discretionary power to evaluate the perceived importance of claimed in–
ventions. Some petitioners may have failed to describe inventions at all, 
that is, technology that was new and that worked; in modern parlance, 
their inventions lacked novelty and/or operability. Others may have 
given up before a final board decision, unable or unwilling to respond 
to board requests. In either scenario, the lack of an issued patent had 
nothing to do with the discretion of the board to test inventions for 
sufficiency. Early patents, thus, might have been, through bureaucratic 
processing, less privilege-like than Congress intended. 
Here are some hints that suggest significant numbers of petitions 
might have failed for non-discretionary reasons. The board appears 
rapidly to have developed a practice of asking for “a more ample 
description,” a model, and/or “more complete drawings” before it made 
a decision.38 In its first week of operation, the board asked petitioner 
Nathan Read to share “plans and descriptions” and after reviewing 
them, requested him to prepare models as well.39 By February 1791, 
 
36. Cf. Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 222 (arguing that the 
framework of the 1790 Patent Act was a “hybrid” of older privileges and 
modern rights). Historians of the British patent system have traced a 
similar administrator-driven change in the nature of patents during the 
century and a half after British patents for invention survived the Statute 
Against Monopolies (1634), as British patent practice evolved to make 
patents less like privileges and more like rights as clerks attended to the 
practical details. Bottomley, supra note 9, at 48–49, 63 (noting the 
decreased emphasis in considering how an invention contributed to the 
public good over the eighteenth century and that high fees and the 
convoluted process served to “weed out” about 20% of patents); Bracha, 
Commodification, supra note 3, at 201–02 (describing British shift via law 
in action); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An 
Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1294 (2001) 
(arguing that English patents had become rights by the late eighteenth 
century). 
37. Federico, supra note 17, at 244–45 (noting surviving records). 
38.  “From Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, 4 February 1791,” 
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0019 [Original source: The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 January–31 March 1791, ed. Julian P. Boyd. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 240–241] (as cited in 
Federico, supra note 17, at 243). 
39. Notation made April 17, 1790, Memorandum Book of Department of 
State, 1789–95, supra note 29, at 49. 
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Jefferson referred to this practice as a “general rule.”40 Further, records 
indicate that the board held hearings, asking petitioners to appear in 
person and explain their inventions.41 All of these actions were extra-
statutory. The statute stated that patentees did not have to provide an 
enabling specification (that is, a detailed description) or model until the 
patent had already been granted and made no mention of hearings.42 
Following the statutory guidance, early petitioners appear to have 
provided very little detail about their inventions in their initial 
petitions.43 
Responding to the board demands would have increased the upfront 
expense to petitioners, possibly significantly. Filing a petition cost fifty 
cents. Once a patent was approved, the applicant had to pay for filing 
a specification and having a patent “made out,” sealed, and endorsed, 
fees totaling $3.20 plus a per word charge, resulting in a final cost of 
$4–5.44 A stagecoach ride from New York to Philadelphia to appear 
before the board could cost $5 and take two days and then there might 
be the need to pay for food and lodging.45 Jacob Isaacks, of Newport, 
Rhode Island, who travelled to Philadelphia in early 1791 to 
demonstrate his invention, complained to Jefferson that “his delay here 
is very distressing” on account of his poverty.46 If petitioners had not 
already prepared drawings or a model, they would have faced prepar–
 
40. “From Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston,” supra note 38. 
41. Memorandum Book of Department of State, 1789-1795, supra note 29, at 
49, 61, 63, 65, 68, 70–72, 75–76 (notes of meetings held April, June and 
July, 1790); see also Federico, supra note 17, at 242; Walterscheid, supra 
note 3, at 178–81. 
42. Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–111 (1790). 
43. Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 162, 164 (noting that Oliver Evans’ 
petition was unusual in its specificity); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra 
note 3, at 192 (discussing the emphasis on social contribution in petitions 
rather than enabling details). 
44. Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1, 7; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 31, 35.  
45. The Swift-Sure, A New Line of Stages, Gazette U.S. & Phila. Daily 
Advertiser, July 15, 1799. 
46. “III. Secretary of State to Caspar Wistar, Jr., 20 March 1791,” Founders 
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-19-02-0171-0004 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 January–31 March 1791, ed. Julian P. Boyd. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 615–616]; “Editorial Note: 
Experiments in Desalination of Sea Water,” Founders Online, National 
Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-
0171-0001 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 
January–31 March 1791, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974, pp. 608–614] (describing Isaacks as “aged, infirm 
and poor resident of Newport” and detailing his travels to Philadelphia via 
New York). 
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ation costs, which might include hiring someone to do the work. Some 
petitioners might simply have been unable to pay these extra expenses. 
Others might have reconsidered the worth of a patent when such 
expenditures were required without any guarantee that a patent would 
issue. Such recalculation seems to have been in effect among those who 
had petitioned Congress directly for federal patents before passage of 
the 1790 Act. Faced with the newly formalized procedure, most 
evidently did not bother to resubmit petitions to the board.47 If we allow 
for the possibility that a fraction of ungranted petitions were simply 
dropped by inventors, the grant rate of those inventors who took the 
trouble to prepare additional materials and to appear before the board 
rises, coming closer to rates routinely achieved by the Patent Office 
once its denials were subject to review and Congress removed the 
criterion of importance from its bureaucratic mandate.48 
In addition to abandoned petitions, it is both possible and 
undeterminable, given the dearth of records, that another fraction of 
petitions foundered when applicants failed to convince board members 
that their inventions worked or were new. Another hint exists in the 
form of surviving petitions, the text of which concentrated on 
explaining the benefits of the invention rather than its details.49 The 
board’s “general rule” of seeking additional information might have 
been in aid not only of assessment of importance but also, or even 
primarily, a threshold assessment of novelty and operability. There is 
no reason to believe that inventors in this period were any less likely 
than those in later decades to reinvent known devices unwittingly or to 
claim perpetual motion machines.50 Isaacks was given the opportunity 
to demonstrate his desalination process for Jefferson and an assembled 
group of scientific Philadelphians, for example, but experimentation 
proved that his claimed invention “does not facilitate the separation of 
 
47. Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 173. 
48. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 25 (showing grant rates in early 
examination years at around 66%); Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan 
Marco, What Is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent?, 17 Yale J.L. 
& Tech. 203, 211 (2015) (showing grant rates at the turn of the twenty-
first century from 40–70%). 
49.  Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 192. 
50. Two years into his tenure as Superintendent of Patents, William 
Thornton told John Quincy Adams that “almost all the applications for 
Patents” were not new. Entry in John Quincy Adams’s Diary (Dec. 27, 
1804), The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection 
(Mass. Hist. Soc’y ed., 2020), http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries/php/ 
popup?id=jqad27_119 [https://perma.cc/69ND-EKUY]; also included in 
Papers relating to the administration of the U.S. Patent Office 
Superintendency of William Thornton, 1802–1828, Harris, C.M. National 
Archives Microfilm [hereinafter Thornton Papers]. 
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sea-water from it’s [sic] salt.”51 Jefferson, who was keenly interested in 
establishing a navy, understood the importance of turning sea water 
into drinking water.52 Isaacks, however, had not improved known 
distillation techniques.53 
These hints suggest that it is at least possible that the board was 
functioning less like a monarch exercising “grace and favour,” that is, 
granting privileges to serve its members’ elite view of the national 
interest, and more like modern patent examiners, allowing patents if 
basic requirements were met.54 Faced with the near-impossible task of 
predicting the future of a technology to contribute to the nation, the 
board might have retreated to some form of believable operability and 
apparent novelty, tacitly agreeing that any petitioner who met those 
hurdles had shown sufficient usefulness and importance and thus 
sharply limiting its own discretion.55 
Undoubtedly, Jefferson promoted the use of “general rules” to 
minimize the time and effort of the board’s statutory duties, which he 
complained “cut[] up his time into the most useless fragments.”56 Later, 
he remembered the board’s efforts to reduce “their decisions to a system 
 
51. “VI. Affidavit of the Secretary of State on the Result of the Experiments, 
26 March 1791,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0171-0007 [Original source: 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 January–31 March 1791, ed. 
Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 617–618]. 
52. “III. Secretary of State to Caspar Wistar, Jr.,” supra note 46 (stating that 
it was an “advantage” of Issacks’ claim that it will increase knowledge 
among “masters of vessels” about distillation of sea water). For Jefferson’s 
involvement in the debates over the formation of a navy, eventually 
established in 1794, see Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, The Rise 
of American Naval Power, 1776–1918, at 17–18 (Princeton Univ. Press 
5th prtg. 1967). See generally Julia H. Macleod, Jefferson and the Navy: A 
Defense, 8 Huntington Libr. Q. 153 (1945) (discussing Jefferson’s views 
on the establishment of a navy).  
53. Isaacks had chosen to petition Congress for “a reward suitable to the 
importance of the discovery, and adequate to his expences [sic]” rather than 
to seek a patent and Jefferson’s investigations thus resulted in a report to 
Congress and no reward to Isaacks. “Editorial Note,” supra note 46, at n12. 
54. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 22. 
55. See Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 665–66 (arguing that Congress envisioned 
that courts would aid in winnowing out invalid patents through post-grant 
repeal process included in Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793). 
56. “From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson, 1 April 1792,” Founders 
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-23-02-0312 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
vol. 23, 1 January–31 May 1792, ed. Charles T. Cullen. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 363]. 
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of rules as fast as the cases presented should furnish materials.”57 In 
addition to the general rule of requiring full information about the 
invention to inform the decision on patentability, Jefferson described 
rules against patenting a machine based on a new use, against a “change 
of material” as a patentable invention, and against patenting a “mere 
change of form.”58 None of these rules had any explicit statutory basis; 
they were interpretations of the statute by the bureaucrats, struggling 
to implement a broad mandate.59 And each of them, over time, was 
incorporated into patent law.60 
Without any surviving details of board deliberations, it is not 
possible to determine whether when deciding to grant a petition, the 
board did so based on minimal criteria of novelty and operability, as 
defined by “general rules,”—a liberal approach that would leave it to 
the market to determine the usefulness and importance of such 
inventions—or whether it used a two-step process, separately consid–
ering novelty and operability and additionally making a discretionary 
judgment that some new and operable inventions were more important, 
and thus patent-worthy, than others.61 Again, we have hints. We can 
consider the patents that were granted. The first, to Samuel Hopkins, 
for a method of making potash, gained support from some of the early 
republic’s scientific leaders, but utterly failed in the marketplace, 
despite Hopkins’ strenuous efforts to commercialize it.62 Did Jefferson 
and his colleagues hope that this more expensive method to create a 
 
57. Id.; “Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, 25 August 1814,” Founders 
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/03-07-02-0440 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
Retirement Series, vol. 7, 28 November 1813 to 30 September 1814, ed. J. 
Jefferson Looney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 606–
607]. Jefferson also referred to the formulation of such rules based on 
experience as a slow process, which may be why Oliver Evans’ patent, the 
third issued, combined several different inventions, while a later applicant 
was required to divide multiple inventions into separate petitions, a require–
ment that is now also part of patent examination practice. Federico, supra 
note 17, at 246–47. 
58. “From Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson,” supra note 30. 
59. The struggles of bureaucrats to interpret statutes in order to do their jobs 
were widespread across the new government. See White, supra note 24, 
at 10 (detailing operational details worked out in 1790s). 
60. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 262 (1850) (change of material); 
Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142, 1143 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,173) 
(new use); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 119 (1874) (change of form). 
61. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 274–75 (noting Adam Smith’s unen–
thusiastic views of patents in markets and Smith’s influence on Jefferson). 
62. David W. Maxey, Samuel Hopkins, the Holder of the First U.S. Patent: 
A Study of Failure, 122 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 3, 27, 32–33 
(1998). 
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useful industrial chemical would prove a social benefit, or did they 
simply see no harm in letting the market decide? As Jefferson noted in 
1792, the petitioners themselves “always deemed” their inventions 
“valuable.”63  
More telling, perhaps, is the board’s infamous decision to grant a 
patent to each of four steamboat inventors, all on August 26, 1791, 
without resolving who had priority or whose technology was superior.64 
With no statutory provision specifying a means of identifying the true 
inventor from among competing candidates (later known as interference 
proceedings), the board chose not to pick a favorite.65 This solution did 
not seem to advance the public good, insofar as it failed to signal to 
investors which technology offered the best chance of improved 
navigation.66 The market would have to sort among the contenders 
without the aid of the patent system.67 Perhaps predictably, the 
conflicting patents seem to have discouraged investment, with patentee 
John Fitch’s investors, for example, quitting soon after he failed to gain 
a clear monopoly.68 Further, the fourteen-year exclusivity granted to 
the four patentees created a period of “suspended activity” and 
“confusion” during which neither they nor others improved steamboat 
technology.69  
There is one last hint of Jefferson’s perspective on the board’s 
discretion under the Patent Act of 1790. When communicating with 
Hugh Williamson, a congressman involved in drafting a new patent act, 
Jefferson noted that “fixed rules” for patent processing were “more 
likely” “to deal out justice without partiality or favouritism,” indicating 
 
63. “From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56. 
64. Federico, supra note 17, at 248. See generally Frank D. Prager, The Steam 
Boat Interference, 1787–1793, 40 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 611 (1958) (dis–
cussing the controversy among the four inventors). 
65. Federico, supra note 17, at 248; Prager, supra note 64, at 636–37. Such a 
provision was included in the Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, § 9, 
1 Stat. 318, 322–23 (1793). 
66. See Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 186–90. 
67. The patent board’s tolerance of unclear boundaries echoes the conflicting 
rights granted by the Stationer’s Company in England in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century, a hallmark of the privilege era of copyright. 
Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from 
Gutenberg to Gates 25–26 (2009) (describing operation of Stationer’s 
Company); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 34–36 (analyzing 
privilege aspects of early copyright). My thanks to Oren Bracha for noting 
this comparison. 
68. Andrea Sutcliffe, Steam: The Untold Story of America’s First 
Great Invention 119 (2004). 
69. Prager, supra note 64, at 640–41. 
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some discomfort with broad discretion and the privilege-like nature of 
patents it supported.70  
None of these extra-statutory board practices alleviated the 
inability of an unsuccessful petitioner to appeal a patent denial. 
However much the bureaucrats may have constrained their statutory 
discretion in the interest of efficiency, inventors lacked a forum to 
demand a patent as of right.71 Nor did Jefferson in his later writings 
acknowledge any contradiction between trusting market forces to weed 
out impractical inventions and his espoused commitment to granting 
patents only when they offered social benefit. Further, rules such as 
refusing patents for new uses and changes of material or form, while 
constraining discretion, also were arguably proxies for insufficiently 
useful and important inventions. For these reasons, I am not arguing 
that the board members and those who interacted with the board to 
obtain patents developed a rights-based understanding of patents in 
these three years. Rather, I am arguing that from the outset, practical 
necessity translated what could have been a very high bar to obtaining 
patents into a system that was less discretionary and more protective 
of inventor’s rights than the statutory language and grant rate suggests. 
Once we reconsider how the board processed patent petitions, we 
also gain new perspective on the relevant expertise of board members, 
as not only elite in power and privilege, but also in technical training. 
The legislators who drafted the Patent Act of 1790 and designated the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General as the 
patent administrators would have assumed that any holder of those 
positions would be an educated gentleman in an era when education 
was not confined by disciplines.72 Such a man would be a participant in 
 
70. “From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56;  Walterscheid, 
supra note 3, at 195–200, 205–06 (describing Jefferson’s participation in 
enacting a new law, including drafting a proposed bill). 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
72. The assumption of a government of educated gentleman was demonstrated 
by the actions of the Constitutional Convention, the type of men serving at 
that time under the Articles of Confederation, and Washington’s selections. 
White, supra note 24, at 26, 30 (noting the lack of debate about executive 
organization at the Constitutional Convention, the carry-over of men 
already serving under the Articles of Confederation into the Washington 
administration (including Knox), and Washington’s search for “men of 
stature,” including Washington’s description of the desirable Secretary of 
War as “not only of competent skill in the science of War, but possessing a 
general knowledge of political subjects, of known attachment to the 
Government we have chosen, and of proved integrity”)(quoting “From 
George Washington to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 22 January 1794,” 
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-15-02-0084 [Original source: The Papers of 
George Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 15, 1 January–30 April 1794, 
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the republic of letters, in which the knowledge of law and political 
philosophy shared by many politicians did not preclude equal famil–
iarity with natural philosophy and developments in machines and 
manufactures.73 They might have been swayed by the fact that 
Jefferson, already appointed Secretary of State when the Act was 
passed, was “perhaps the public person in the United States most suited 
to administer the patent law”74 because of his broad knowledge of 
science and technology and familiarity with relevant literature in other 
languages.75 And they might have picked the Secretary of War because 
in the eighteenth century (and well into the nineteenth century), 
engineering and other technical knowledge formed part of what former 
General Washington referred to as “the science of War,” taught in 
military schools, where students learned navigation, surveying, and 
weaponry, along with the use of technical instruments that allowed 
necessary calculations.76 These men might have been designated because 
of their knowledge of national affairs that allowed them to assess the 
social benefit of inventions, but they also might have been designated 
because of their likely ability to comprehend “manufacture[s], engine[s], 
machine[s], [and] device[s],” at a time when the government had no 
technical library.77 
As the US patent system developed, the board members, 
embodying both state power at the highest level and technical expertise, 
 
ed. Christine Sternberg Patrick. Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2009, pp. 103–105]). 
73. Thomson, supra note 29, at 25–30, 36 (describing eighteenth-century 
American gentleman’s education, including that of Secretary of State 
Jefferson and future president John Adams, and noting the intellectual 
abilities of the members of the Continental Congress, with emphasis on 
scientific and technical learning). 
74. Federico, supra note 17, at 238. 
75. Thomson, supra note 29, at 2–3. Jefferson had been appointed Secretary 
of State on September 26, 1789 and took office on March 22, 1790. 
Malone, supra note 35, at 243 n.3; id. at 254–55. 
76. “From George Washington to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,” supra note 
72; Neil Longley York, Mechanical Metamorphosis: Techno–
logical Change in Revolutionary America 112 (1985) (noting that 
“technical knowledge . . . is the stock in trade of a professional military 
engineer” in the late eighteenth century). In this period, the United States 
lacked military schools, instead importing trained engineers from Europe to 
assist the military during the Revolution. Id. at 112–13. For eighteenth-
century European engineering education, see Peter Lundgreen, Engineering 
Education in Europe and the U.S.A., 1750–1930: The Rise to Dominance 
of School Culture and the Engineering Professions, 47 Annals Science 33, 
36, 41, 46, 52 (1990). For the founding of West Point as first US military 
school in 1802, see id. at 52. 
77. Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (1790). 
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enacted the nature and purpose of patents through the practical details 
of petition processing.  
II. Registration and William Thornton, 1793–1836 
Despite the apparently large numbers of ungranted patent petitions 
under the first patent regime, there is little evidence that many 
inventors pushed for a change, another hint that perhaps some of the 
ungranted petitions might have been abandoned rather than denied.78 
It was rather the bureaucrats who complained. Given his other respon–
sibilities, Jefferson soon found himself “oppressed beyond measure” by 
the duties of patent examination.79 By December 1791, Jefferson had 
drafted a proposal for a simple registration system combined with a 
robust publication requirement, that is, a plan to push all evaluation of 
patents to the market and the courts.80 
While Jefferson’s draft bill did not become law, in the Patent Act 
of 1793, Congress abolished the patent board, replacing substantive 
evaluation by high-ranking officials with a registration system for 
patents under the supervision of the State Department.81 In place of 
cabinet members, the State Department clerk was given the task of 
 
78. The four steamboat inventors were disgruntled by the result of their 
petitions and the attorney for one of them published a pamphlet attacking 
the patent system. Lubar, supra note 3, at 936 & n.11 (citing Joseph 
Barnes, Treatise on the Justice, Policy, and Utility of 
Establishing an Effectual System for Promoting the Progress 
of Useful Arts 27–34 (1792)); Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 193; cf. 
Edward C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 39 
Essays in Hist. (1998), http://www.essaysinhistory.com/thomas-jefferson-
and-the-patent-act-of-1793/ [https://perma.cc/2HVH-GZGP] (claiming 
that inventors must have objected to the time-consuming nature of this 
process and to the low issuance rates); Federico, supra note 17, at 250 
(claiming without citation that “some persons” were unhappy that the 
board did not grant patents “freely”). 
79. “From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56; see also 
Malone, supra note 35, at 281 (noting that patents were “the most time-
consuming of [Jefferson’s] domestic duties”). 
80.  “A Bill to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts, [1 December 1791],” 
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Jefferson/01-22-02-0322 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 22, 6 August 1791 – 31 December 1791, ed. Charles T. Cullen. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 359–362]; Malone, supra 
note 35, at 285 (noting that Jefferson, in his draft bill, would have “reliev[ed] 
himself of all except nominal functions”); Walterscheid, supra note 78 
(calling Jefferson’s proposed publication requirements “onerous” and costly). 
81. Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, §§ 1, 3, 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–323 
(1793) (requiring the Secretary of State to “cause letters patent to be 
made out” to any inventor who pays a fee, swears that they have invented, 
and delivers description to Secretary of State). 
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processing patent applications.82 The new Patent Act switched the locus 
of evaluation of the application from government officials to the 
inventor, by requiring a signed, witnessed oath of the applicant that 
they were the “true inventor.”83 Incorporating the Board’s extra-
statutory practice, Congress now required “a written description of his 
[sic] invention . . . in . . . full, clear and exact terms,” drawings, and a 
model (if applicable) before the patent would be granted.84 Further, in 
imitation of English practice, Congress also encouraged inventors to 
evaluate the worth of their inventions by raising the application fee to 
$30.85 If the paperwork was correctly submitted and the inventor paid 
that sum, the patent was to be drafted and forwarded to the Secretary 
of State for signature.86 While there was still no right to appeal a denial, 
there was, as the Attorney General would repeatedly opine and the 
courts confirm, also no statutorily recognized discretion to deny a 
patent based on substance.87 Patents had, by Congressional mandate, 
seemingly switched from privilege to a right “which the citizen may 
demand, and which the officers of government have no power to 
withhold.”88  
This interpretation was based on the new statutory language. From 
a statute offering unfettered discretion to consider the substance of an 
invention, the United States had switched to a statute without examin–
ation or discretion. Substantive review was only ex post, in the federal 
courts.89 A close examination of patent making under the earlier system 
 
82. Id. § 11. 
83. Id. § 3. 
84. Id.; see Biagioli, supra note 10, at 1149 (analyzing the significance of oath 
and specification). Note that while the 1790 Act had used gender inclusive 
language to refer to inventors, Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1, 
Stat. 109, 109–10 (1790) (“he, she, or they”), the 1793 Act used only “he 
or they,” Patent Act of 1793 § 1. 
85. Patent Act of 1793 § 11; Bottomley, supra note 9, at 63 (showing 
reliance on fees in lieu of examination). While a great increase, this fee 
was still “among the lowest in the world in relation to per capita income.” 
Khan, supra note 10, at 54. 
86.  Patent Act of 1793 § 1 (indicating that once the inventor met the 
requirements of submission, the Secretary “shall cause the seal of the 
United States” to be “affixed” to the “letters patent”). 
87. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
88. Peter A. Browne, Mechanical Jurisprudence, No. 14, 3 Franklin J. & 
Am. Mechanics’ Magazine 176 (March 1827) (lawyer describing US 
patent as “constitutional right”). 
89. Court evaluation included the poorly understood judicial repeal procedure. 
Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 668–69. Evaluating the role of the courts in 
the patent system during this period, and into the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, is difficult, as there were very few published patent 
cases. There were only six reported United States patent decisions between 
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revealed hints of procedures constraining discretion, as administrators 
sought to manage their workload. A clerk’s eye view of the four decades 
of the registration system shows bureaucrats seizing discretion. Again, 
administrators in their enactment of the law shaped the nature and 
purpose of patents. 
Not surprisingly, while the increase in fees seems to have reduced 
the number of petitions initially, with lowered barriers to a patent 
grant, as well as the growing population of the United States, applic–
ations, and hence issued patents, soon began to increase.90 While the 
State Department issued twenty-two patents under the new system in 
1794, in 1801 there were forty-four.91 The paperwork for each had to be 
collected, requiring correspondence with the applicant if they had failed 
to submit all the required elements, and then the patent had to be 
written out by hand.92 The patent workload became increasingly 
onerous for the small State Department staff and, in 1802, then 
Secretary of State James Madison, serving under now President 
Thomas Jefferson, appointed William Thornton as the first federal 
employee dedicated full-time to processing patent applications.93 
Thornton kept his position until his death in 1828, allowing him ample 
opportunity to shape the US patent system.94 
Formally, Thornton was a clerk and his appointment did not 
change the registration system.95 But he and others immediately termed 
his role that of “Superintendent of Patents” and Thornton began 
organizing a patent office, with dedicated space and staff.96 As in the  
1800 and 1809, and a further thirty-seven cases between 1810 and 1819. 
Khan, supra note 3, at 63. The situation did not change significantly in the 
next decades. Khan finds thirty-six patent cases between 1820 and 1829 and 
thirty-seven cases between 1830 and 1839. Id. Cf. Christopher Beauchamp, 
The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L.J. 848, 854–56 (2016) 
(noting a rapid increase after 1840 in patent case filings, as distinct from 
reported decisions). 
90. U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S. Pat. & 
Trademark Off., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ 
h_counts.htm [https://perma.cc/U4HF-XG5U] (last modified Oct. 9, 
2020) (utility patents granted per year). 
91. Id. 
92. Preston, supra note 4, at 344 (noting that Thornton sometimes had to ask 
inventors for more details); see also Thornton Papers, supra note 50, 
(scattered examples of correspondence with applicants). 
93.  Preston, supra note 4, at 334. 
94.  Id. 
95. Id. at 335. 
96. Id. at 335–37; “To James Madison from William Thornton, 27 November 
1807,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives. 
gov/documents/Madison/99-01-02-2366 [Early Access document] (des–
cribing his role as “Superintendent of the Patent Office”). Cf. Entry in John 
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prior patent regime, the nature of the man acting as a patent bureau–
crat mattered, although under the registration system it was the 
Secretary of State rather than Congress who decided what sort of man 
should fill the role. In choosing Thornton, Madison selected a man 
similar to Jefferson in education, wealth, and accomplishments. 
Thornton had the ability and interest to consider the content of patent 
applications and to understand how patents were used by inventors and 
investors. 
Like Jefferson, Thornton had scientific and technical training, an 
international perspective, and an ample inheritance.97 Born in the 
British West Indies to a family whose wealth came from sugar 
plantations worked by enslaved labor, Thornton had been raised in 
England, trained as a physician in Edinburgh, and spent time in London 
and Paris before emigrating to the United States, settling in 
Philadelphia.98 He became close friends with Madison when they roomed 
at the same boarding house while Madison was attending the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787, and in Washington City they were 
neighbors and jointly owned racehorses.99 He was also friends with 
Washington and Jefferson.100 While living in Philadelphia, Thornton 
had invested in Fitch’s steamboat company, beginning decades of 
involvement with steamboat technology and the patent system.101 
Thornton closely followed Fitch’s patent travails—which included the 
disappointing decision of the patent board to award simultaneous 
patents to all steamboat inventors—and advised him about patent 
strategy. Thornton also considered himself an inventor of steamboat 
 
Quincy Adams’s Diary (Dec. 27, 1804), supra note 50 (calling Thornton 
“Commissioner of Patents”). 
97. These details of Thornton’s life are drawn from Beatrice Starr Jenkins, 
William Thornton: Small Star of the American Enlightenment 
(1982); Elinor Stearns & David N. Yerkes, William Thornton: A 
Renaissance Man in the Federal City (1976); Allen C. Clark, Doctor 
and Mrs. William Thornton, 18 Recs. Colum. Hist. Soc’y 144 (1915); 
C.M. Harris, Biographical Sketch of William Thornton, from 1759 to 1802, 
in Papers of William Thornton, Volume One, 1781–1802 xxxi-liii 
(C.M. Harris, ed., 1995); Dobyns, supra note 4, at 53–56. 
98.  Stearns & Yerkes, supra note 97, at 3; Jenkins, supra note 97, at v; 
Harris, supra note 97, at xxxiii-xlii. 
99.  Stearns & Yerkes, supra note 97, at 9; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 55. 
100. Clark, supra note 97, at 169 (“Dr. Thornton was proud of the intimacy 
with General Washington . . . .”); Stearns & Yerkes, supra note 97, at 
38 (noting that Thomas Jefferson was “among the distinguished acquain–
tances and friends who visited” Thornton). 
101.  Harris, supra note 97, at xlv-xlvi; Clark, supra note 97, at 184. 
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technology.102 After he won a competition to design the Capitol 
Building, Thornton moved to Washington City and then served as a 
Commissioner of the District of Columbia.103 It was when his term as 
Commissioner ended that Madison appointed him to the patent 
clerkship, allowing him to retain a federal salary.104 Despite Thornton’s 
familial wealth, he struggled throughout his life to maintain funds 
sufficient to support his expensive lifestyle, which included multiple 
homes and enslaved servants.105  
In reading and processing patent applications, Thornton was never 
shy about exercising his elite expertise and drawing upon his extensive 
social capital. The first patent bureaucrat to engage directly with the 
patent system as an inventor and investor, he enacted a patent system 
designed to serve “true inventor[s]” while regarding the broader public 
with near hostility.106 While he occasionally acknowledged that the 
public would benefit from the patent system, in Thornton’s artic–
ulations, any social benefit in the form of technological progress was 
not so much the goal as an incidental result. To protect true inventors 
and maintain the value of their patents, Thornton repeatedly exercised 
his judgment about the substance of patent applications. 
Although the patent system created by the 1793 Act is usually 
described as a registration system requiring only low-level paper-
processing by bureaucrats, it in fact required substantive review. In 
 
102. Sutcliffe, supra note 68, at 70, 76, 120; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 26, 67–
76. 
103.  Harris, supra note 97, at xlvii-li; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 54-55. 
104. Harris, supra note 97, at liii; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 55. For discussions 
of patent practice during Thornton’s tenure, see Dobyns, supra note 4, at 
57, 60–66, 82–83, 92–106; William I. Wyman, Dr. William Thornton and 
the Patent Office to 1836, in 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 83, 83–87 (1936); 
Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 253; Preston, supra note 4, at 338–40. 
105. For Thornton’s financial situation, see, for example, Dobyns, supra note 
4, at 106, noting that Thornton “complain[ed] about his salary” until “[h]e 
was very near the end of his life”; id. at 65, discussing Thornton’s financial 
commitments and noting that Thornton “had received no money from his 
property in the West Indies for two years.” In the 1790s, Thornton owned 
“some 70 slaves” in Tortula. Charles M. Harris, William Thornton (1759-
1828), Libr. of Cong. (2001), https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/adecenter/ 
essays/B-Thornton.html [https://perma.cc/YV77-Z48E]. Notes regarding 
the purchase of slaves in the United States are included in the papers of 
Thornton’s wife. See, e.g., entry of Feb. 27, 1796 (“bought a negro named 
Tome”), Anna Maria Brodeau Thornton papers, 1793-1861, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. At one point, Thornton 
owned a house, two farms, and a city garden. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 
55. 
106.  Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793) 
(requiring applicant to swear they are the “true inventor” before receiving 
patent).  
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addition to ensuring each applicant had submitted every piece of 
required paperwork, Thornton had to decide if a model was “necessary,” 
which required reading to determine whether the claimed invention was 
a machine that could be modeled.107 The new act also provided for 
arbitration in the case of “interfering applications,” but provided no 
guidance as to what it meant for applications to interfere.108 Again, that 
was left to Thornton to decide based on the substance of each applic–
ation, drawing upon, presumably, some combination of his records of 
pending applications (Thornton’s record keeping was often behind) and 
his memory of applications he had read.109 
Like Jefferson and the other board members, Thornton innovated 
in extra-statutory ways during his two-decade tenure, both to make his 
workload more tolerable and to promote his understanding of patents 
and the patent system. He took the board’s repeated requests for 
additional information and Jefferson’s “general rules” one step further, 
issuing a booklet for patent applicants that described the requested 
form and content of patent applications.110 He developed the practice of 
accepting and filing caveats (a means of establishing priority of 
invention in use in England) and of allowing patentees to seek 
reissuance to correct errors, both of which practices were subsequently 
formalized as part of patent law.111  
These practices shaped the nature of granted patents. Reissuance 
allowed the substance of a patent to change in ways Thornton believed 
were protecting true inventors from errors, whether theirs or his, and 
caveats rendered later applications non-novel, even though Thornton 
lacked authority to deny applications on that ground. By incorporating 
these ways of making patents, Thornton enacted his prioritization of 
individual inventor rights over any broader concept of the public good. 
Reissue practice, in particular, proved frustrating to businesses as it  
107. Patent Act of 1793 §3. 
108. Id. § 9. 
109. Preston, supra note 4, at 336–37. 
110. Patents, 6 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 97, 98 (1923) (reprint of 1811 version of 
pamphlet). This practice would be ratified by Congress in 1870. Patent 
Act of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 (1870). 
111. Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, §§ 12 (caveats), 13 (reissuance), 5 
Stat. 117, 121–22 (1836). According to patent attorney and historian Levin 
H. Campbell, the practice of reissuance was first developed in 1817 and 
confirmed in Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 244 (1832) (acknowledging 
“settled practice”). Levin H. Campbell, Correspondence, 65 Sci. Am. 69 
(1891); see also Kendall J. Dood, Pursuing the Essence of Inventions: 
Reissuing Patents in the 19th Century, 32 Tech. & Culture 999, 999–1000 
(1991). For British caveat practice, see Bottomley, supra note 9, at 53–54. 
Post-grant corrections of patents continue to the present and provisional 
applications have replaced the earlier caveats. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(b), 134(b), 
318(a), 328(a) (2018). 
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allowed the coverage of patents, and thus the possibility of infringe–
ment, to change throughout their term.112 
Lacking explicit authority, Thornton repeatedly assumed authority, 
enacting his own interpretation of the law. Most controversially, he was 
unwilling to grant patents to inventions he believed were not new. He 
made no secret of his activities, outlining them for then-Secretary of 
State Robert Smith in 1810 as “labours perhaps . . . more . . . the duties 
of conscience than of office.”113 His actions led some inventors to 
complain to the Secretary of State and resulted in multiple Attorney 
General opinions that Thornton (and the entire executive branch) 
lacked the discretion to deny a patent to any petitioner who fulfilled 
the paperwork requirements.114 Even after those rebukes, Thornton 
continued to warn applicants in correspondence that their inventions 
were not new or useful115 and if forced to issue such patents, he 
sometimes changed the language of the patents he drafted to indicate 
his distrust of their claimed novelty, adding terms such as “alleged” to 
the statement that the named recipient was the true inventor and/or 
noting anticipating prior art on the back of the document.116 In one 
case, Thornton provoked a patentee into bringing a libel suit regarding 
Thornton’s continued public insistence that a patent claiming the 
 
112. Dood, supra note 111, at 1006 (noting that the practice was eventually 
greatly curtailed). 
113. “Letter from William Thornton to Robert Smith, Dec. 19, 1810,” in 
Thornton Papers, supra note 50. For examples, “Letter from William 
Thornton to Samuel Pitkin, April 7, 1806” (pricking machine not novel); 
“[P]rotest” to Robert Fulton’s patent as not new, Feb. 8, 1811, each in 
Thornton Papers, supra note 50; and those referenced in Walterscheid, 
supra note 3, at 259, 260 n.54. 
114. Nourse’s Case, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 575 (1822); digested in Stephen D. Law, 
Digest of American Cases Relating to Patents for Invention and 
Copyrights from 1789 to 1862, at 149 (5th ed. 1877). This opinion 
limiting the State Department to ministerial rather than judicial action in 
consideration of a patent application was reiterated after Thornton’s death. 
See Patents, Patent Office, and Clerks, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 454, 454–55 
(1831), digested in Law, supra, at 114. See also Grant, 31 U.S. at 241 (“The 
[S]ecretary of [S]tate may be considered, in issuing patents, as a ministerial 
officer. If the prerequisites of the law be complied with, he can exercise no 
judgment on the question whether the patent shall be issued.”). 
115. See Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 263 n.63. 
116. For a summary of Thornton’s practice in this regard and for specific ex–
amples, see id. at 259–65; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 94, 98; Edward D. 
Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—An Early Patent Controversy, 79 
J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 533, 536–38 (1997). 
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beveling of one edge of a common piece of mill machinery, the “winged 
gudgeon,” was invalid for lack of novelty.117 
In his stubborn crusade to issue only patents that he believed would 
be found valid in court, Thornton articulated a particular vision of the 
purposes of the patent system and the harms poor administration 
posed. He might have returned, like Jefferson, to the “benefit of 
society,” arguing that invalid patents would allow patentees to extract 
license fees for known technologies or to prosecute infringement suits, 
costing Americans needless sums.118 Thomas Fessenden, for example, 
author of the first US patent treatise, agreed with Thornton that 
patents for old inventions were an “abuse” and also agreed that the 
remedy was “due care in the regulation of the patent office,” advocating 
“caution . . . not to grant patents for pseudo inventions.”119 The harm 
from such an abuse, Fessenden thought, was the “deceit” to the 
“public.”120 While Thornton agreed that such patents were “egregious 
impositions” on the public, he focused much more on avoiding the 
“ruin” of true inventors, among whom he saw himself.121 Thornton 
thought the most serious harm was that false patents claiming all or 
some of the true inventor’s invention would render the true inventor’s 
grant almost worthless unless the true inventor engaged in expensive 
litigation.122 
Instead of worrying about whether the public was benefitted or 
harmed by the grant of exclusive rights to inventors, Thornton 
considered the public a source of threat to true inventors. To avoid this 
threat, he had a policy of refusing to provide copies of unexpired patents 
to anyone unless the patentee gave their permission.123 While the Patent 
 
117. See generally Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon, supra note 116 (discuss–
ing the controversy and history).  
118. See “From Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson,” supra note 30. 
119. Thomas G. Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of Patents for New 
Inventions xxxvi (1810). 
120. Id. 
121. “Letter from William Thornton to Robert Smith,” supra note 113; see also 
“Letter from William Thornton to Caleb Kirk, June 10, 1817” (Thornton 
describing himself as “bound in conscience to defend the public against the 
direct and willful impositions of patentees”) in Thornton Papers, supra note 
50. 
122. “Letter from William Thornton to Robert Smith,” supra note 113 (noting 
risk to patentees of “ruin”); see also Preston, supra note 4, at 343–44 
(discussing difficulties of patent litigation). 
123. See, e.g., “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Jan. 23, 1809” 
and “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Feb. 15, 1809” (reit–
erating his policy of only providing copies of issued patents with patentee 
permission) in Thornton Papers, supra note 50; see also Walterscheid, 
supra note 3, at 282–85; Preston, supra note 4, at 341. Id. at 341. 
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Act of 1790 had provided for the availability of patents to the public,124 
the Patent Act of 1793 had omitted this provision and Thornton took 
the position that it required him only to provide copies of disputed 
patents to litigating parties.125 To Thornton, the information contained 
in the patents was not a building block for further American innovation, 
but rather a set of instructions to infringers that would allow them to 
set up competing businesses, or worse yet, to file copycat patent 
applications which he then would be unable to deny.126 Given the 
primitive state of internal transportation, there was some basis for 
Thornton’s fear that a true inventor might lose potential licensing 
revenues to infringing competitors in distant states without any 
knowledge of such loss—and of course, the remedy even if such loss 
were discovered was expensive and time-consuming litigation. Thornton 
preferred to allow each inventor to control information about the details 
of their invention, rather than to consider the files of the Patent Office 
as a public resource. 
As with his attempts to refuse patents for lack of novelty, Thornton 
repeatedly lost on this point. In 1809, the Attorney General ordered 
Thornton to give copies of patents upon request, subject only to 
payment of copying fees.127 He nevertheless continued the policy until 
he was challenged again in 1824 by a group of well-connected men 
committed to the idea that the public should have access to issued 
patents as a means of promoting the progress of American technology. 
Thornton’s fight with the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia, which 
sought to publish copies of patents in its journal, precipitated a months-
long battle that reached all the way to President John Quincy Adams 
before Thornton again had to capitulate.128 
 
124. Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 3, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (1790). 
125. Preston, supra note 4, at 340–41; Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 283. See 
also “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Jan. 23, 1809” and 
“Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Feb. 15, 1809,” supra note 
123 (reiterating his policy of only providing copies of issued patents with 
patentee permission). 
126. Cf. Eric Robinson, James Watt and the Law of Patents, 13 Tech. & 
Culture 115, 130–31 (1972) (explaining that in the late eighteenth 
century, James Watt, English inventor and patentee, expressed similar 
concerns about the uses of patent specifications). 
127. “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, July 8, 1809” (noting 
Attorney General’s “answer in favour of those who have applied for copies 
of Patents”), in Thornton Papers, supra note 50; see also Walterscheid, 
supra note 3, at 284–85; Delivering Copies of Specifications of Patents, 1 
Op. Att’y Gen. 171 (1812), digested in Law, supra note 114, at 206 
(reiterating an unpublished 1809 opinion requiring Thornton to produce 
copies upon request). 
128. Thornton won an opening skirmish, see Right of Citizens to Copies of 
Papers Respecting Patents, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 718, 719 (1825)(recognizing 
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Thornton’s career making patents is striking in two regards. First, 
because of who he was, he persistently defied the law and his superiors 
to shape the patent system and hence patents in accordance with his 
own views, secure in his position. Second, despite having lost every 
battle, Thornton ultimately won the war with respect to the ability of 
and necessity for patent bureaucrats to judge the content of 
applications. In his defiance, Thornton had enacted an approach to 
making patents that Fessenden and others admired, that is, ex ante 
substantive review.  
After Thornton’s death, the registration system became increas–
ingly destabilized. There were three Patent Superintendents in the next 
seven years.129 The first, Thomas Jones, formerly a professor of natural 
philosophy and chemistry at the College of William and Mary, and 
later, first editor of the Franklin Institute’s journal, continued to review 
the substance of applications.130 Like Thornton, he suggested that 
applicants withdraw their applications when he believed their claimed 
inventions were already known, advising them not to spend further 
money for what would be worthless patents.131 This version of advisory 
ex ante review skirted the Superintendent’s lack of authority to deny a 
patent. His successor, John Craig, previously a teacher and headmaster 
in Baltimore, however, refused even to read applications, using his 
statutory lack of discretion as a reason to reduce his workload.132 This 
refusal to exercise any ex ante review resulted in a failure to declare 
interferences, leading to even more invalid patents.133 The third, Colonel 
James Pickett, a former diplomat lacking any relevant technical 
expertise, reportedly relied on long-time employee Charles Keller to 
 
discretion to deny copies of patents granted to others) but ultimately lost 
after Secretary of State Henry Clay intervened. Walterscheid, supra 
note 3, at 289–304; Bruce Sinclair, Philadelphia’s Philosopher 
Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1824–1865, at 
29-30, 32, 42–45 (1974)(describing backgrounds of founders and officers 
and fight with Thornton); Preston, supra note 4, at 340–42. 
129. For an overview of the Superintendents in this period, see Dobyns, supra 
note 4, at 107–24; Preston, supra note 4, at 351. 
130. Sinclair, supra note 128, at 54-56. 
131. Testimony of Thomas P. Jones, in Louis McLane, Report of the 
Secretary of State: In Compliance with a Resolution of the 9th 
of May, with Documents Relating to the Conduct of the 
Superintendent of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 23-398, at 13, 15 
(1st Sess. 1834). 
132. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 113, 116.  
133. Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 263. 
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exercise advisory ex ante review about the novelty of claimed inven–
tions.134 
Overall, these successors lacked the political connections and social 
clout to persist in Thornton’s emphatic civil disobedience. Jones and 
Craig (Pickett only held the position for three months) each faced 
rebellion and criticism from their staff, particularly from Thornton 
hold-overs, leading eventually led to their dismissal.135 By 1835, when 
Craig was dismissed, Keller was the most experienced Patent Office 
employee.136 He drew upon that experience, including six years of 
working under Thornton, to draft a set of proposed Patent Office 
reforms.137 Keller, however, as a self-educated machinist, had even less 
ability than Thornton’s successors to turn his ideas into legally 
sanctioned practice.138 With the appointment of Henry Ellsworth, a 
dedicated administrator, as the fourth successor to Thornton in 1835 
and the Washington arrival of John Ruggles, newly elected Senator 
from Maine and aspiring patentee, Keller found men with the necessary 
social capital and access to power to once again change the role of the 
patent bureaucrat.139 Drawing upon two decades of Thornton 
demonstrating that a technically savvy bureaucrat could sort claimed 
inventions into novel and non-novel categories without undue 
“oppression” to himself, Keller offered the lessons of practical exper–
ience that Ruggles used to inform a new US patent law and the creation 
of the modern Patent Office. 
III. Bureaucratic Expertise, 1836–1860 
To begin the process of statutory reform, Ruggles chaired a Senate 
committee on the patent system and quickly issued a report, describing 
the problems and proposing a full-time patent examiner as the 
solution.140 He agreed with Thornton that the chief problems were the 
 
134. Thaddeus Hyatt, Charles M. Keller and the American Patent Office, 14 
Sci. Am. 310 (1859) (letter to editor about Keller’s duties). 
135. See Dobyns, supra note 4, at 109–11, 115–21. 
136. Id. at 124. 
137. Hyatt, supra note 134, at 310. 
138. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 119. 
139. Id. at 124–25, 127, 131; Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 27 (crediting 
Keller); Preston, supra note 4, at 351 (crediting Ellsworth); The Patent 
Act of 1836, J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 91, 95–96 (1936); Ruggles, John (1789-
1874), Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong., http://bio 
guideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=R000502 
[https://perma.cc/6389-29B4] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). 
140. John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and 
Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4 (1st Sess. 
1835); Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 422–23. The entire Senate Report 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Making Patents 
805 
“evils” resulting from “the unrestrained and promiscuous grant of 
patent[s].”141 He concluded: “The most obvious . . . means [to prevent 
these evils] appears to be to establish a check upon granting of patents, 
allowing them to issue only for such inventions as are in fact new and 
entitled, by the merit of originality and utility, to be protected by 
law.”142 Ruggles identified three questions that this “obvious” solution 
raised: (1) what the nature of the “check” on patents should be, (2) “in 
whom the power to judge of inventions before granting a patent can 
safely be reposed,” and (3) how these judge-like actors could be 
“regulated and guarded to prevent injustice . . . [to] honest and 
meritorious inventors.”143 
The first two questions were familiar. Since 1790, the “check” 
perennially under debate had been patent bureaucrats and Ruggles’ 
innovation of the examiner continued that approach.144 The identity of 
those bureaucrats had swung from department heads to lowly clerks 
and then, with Thornton’s appointment, had been modified to a mid-
level Superintendent of Patents. Madison’s selection of a man with 
technical qualifications had been another bureaucratic innovation that 
largely persisted after Thornton’s death, even if his successors had not 
been intimate friends of presidents.145 In proposing full-time patent 
examiners, Ruggles imagined that this tradition would continue, 
describing the new position with “the power to judge of inventions” as 
“altogether above a mere clerkship,” needing “the exercise and applic–
ation of much scientific acquirement and knowledge of the existing state 
of the arts in all their branches.”146 In Jacksonian America, however, 
unlike in the Federalist years of the Washington administration, this 
tradition would come under new scrutiny. The assumption of govern–
ment by a natural aristocracy had weakened and access to the growing 
number of federal jobs was hotly contested. Jacksonian Democrats 
explicitly espoused rotation in office and the accessibility of civil service 
 
is reprinted in 1836 Senate Committee Report, 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 
853 (1936). 
141. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4. 
142. Id.  
143. Id.  
144. Cf. Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 664 (arguing that courts had 
participated as a check through repeal process). 
145. Preston, supra note 4, at 351 (noting Jones and Craig had technical 
qualifications, although Pittsfield, who remained in the office less than a 
year, did not, nor did Ellsworth, who was given a staff of technically trained 
examiners). 
146. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4. 
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jobs to all.147 By requiring qualifications for examiners that were rare in 
the young republic, the Patent Office risked a return to government by 
elites. 
A staunch Jacksonian, Ruggles articulated this attitude about 
officeholders in his third, new, question about patent administration.148 
Although aware that a “flood” of false “patent monopolies” was 
“embarrassing to the community generally,” Ruggles, like Thornton, 
focused on harm to “honest and meritorious inventors” who, even 
though able to get a patent readily under the registration system, still 
struggled to profit from their invention when others could patent the 
same invention, leaving them only the remedy of expensive litigation.149 
In suggesting ex ante review, Ruggles remained focused on the inventor 
rather than the community, identifying a new potential harm: unwarr–
anted denials. Rather than assuming that those who became examiners, 
as natural aristocrats bound by a code of honor, had the proper skills 
and attitude to perform without need for review, Ruggles suggested 
that examiners needed to be “regulated and guarded” to avoid 
“injustice.”150 Almost a half century after Jefferson had become the first 
patent bureaucrat, Ruggles sought to temper administrative discretion 
with oversight. His solution, enacted into law, was an appellate tribunal 
within the office to consider allegedly improper denials, soon amended 
to include judicial review.151 This legal change was a significant step in 
supporting patents as rights, but it was not sufficient. As under 
previous regimes, there were still practical details left to the 
bureaucrats. 
In the Jacksonian anti-monopoly and anti-privilege philosophy of 
universal access to government largesse, from jobs to corporate charters, 
it was not only the new position of patent examiner with its requirement 
of expertise that was potentially troublesome.152 Patents themselves fit 
only awkwardly in this philosophy. In his report, Ruggles suggested 
that the patent system should “secure [patents] to all descriptions of 
persons, without discrimination.”153 Patents, albeit exclusive rights, 
 
147. Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative 
History, 1829–1861, at vii, 300–01 (1954). 
148. Ruggles, John (1789-1874), supra note 139. 
149. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 3–4. 
150. Id. at 4. For the “culture of honor” of early American politicians, see 
Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the 
New Republic xv (2001). 
151. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4, 6; Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 11, 
5 Stat. 117, 121 (1836). 
152. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 210-11; Hovenkamp, supra note 
3, at 270–71.  
153. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 1. 
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were to be universally available entitlements, granted without “partial–
ity or favouritism,” rather than discretionary privileges.154 Expertise-
based bureaucratic discretion was not the same, he implicitly argued, 
as undemocratic discrimination. At the same time, Ruggles acknowl–
edged that ex ante review would result in fewer patents. Some of those 
“all descriptions of persons” would be denied patents, even after 
appeal.155 The universal right to a patent came with fine print: no 
patent if the applicant did not convince an examiner the invention was 
useful and, particularly, novel. 
As Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested, the examination system 
initiated in 1836 persisted as the form of the patent system because 
Ruggles’ interpretation prevailed.156 Despite ex ante review that 
resulted in some rejections, patents achieved a status as rights rather 
than privileges. Under the modern examination process, the government 
grant of exclusivity to inventors has been largely accepted as “nondis–
cretionary” and “free from capture,” successfully creating a “patent 
exceptionalism” from the hostility toward monopolies both in the Age 
of Jackson and well into the twentieth century.157 This state of affairs, 
however, was not simply a matter of legislative enactment, even 
supported by judicial decisions.158 The first examiners and the newly 
designated Commissioner of Patents had to experiment with exercising 
their “power to judge” and negotiate the hiring of examiners.159 
The new system had immediate, highly visible results. The number 
of patents issued per year dropped precipitously, from 737 in 1835 to 
435 in 1837, with the Commissioner estimating that allowance rates 
had dropped from nearly 100% to about 66%.160 As Ruggles had hoped, 
the perception of patents also shifted, with an apparent increased 
confidence in their commercial value.161 The “honest and meritorious 
 
154. “From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56; accord 
Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 212. 
155. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 1. 
156. Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 270. 
157. Id. at 271, 275, 306; accord Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 
209. 
158. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 215–16 (arguing that the 
privilege framework was not swept away by the 1836 Act but required 
judicial development of the utility doctrine). 
159. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4. Ellsworth became the first Commissioner, and 
Keller the first examiner, although within four months, Ellsworth was 
suggesting a second examiner was needed. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 136, 
141–42.  
160. Henry Ellsworth, Report from the Commissioner of Patents, 
H.R. Doc. No. 80, at 1 (3d sess. 1838). 
161. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 6; B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth Sokoloff, History 
Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in 
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inventor” was in a stronger position to commercialize an invention 
through a patent because of ex ante review.162 Yet the inventive comm–
unity agreed with Ruggles that unwarranted denials were a harm and, 
unsurprisingly, felt that any rejections experienced by themselves or 
their clients were unwarranted, a harm against which agency and court 
review was not a sufficient guard.163 Every applicant thought of 
themselves an “honest and meritorious inventor,” unaware that their 
“ignorance of . . . the state of the arts and manufactures, and of the 
inventions made in other countries” might make them not a “true 
inventor.”164 
This tension led, for the first time, to criticism about the type of 
man given this “power to judge.”165 As has been documented by Robert 
Post, the nation’s largest patent agency, Munn & Co., led a public 
campaign against examiners.166 The criticism, largely contained within 
the pages of Scientific American, a weekly newspaper published by the 
agency, was not that ex ante review was a mistake.167 Rather, the 
critique was that the men selected as examiners were too elite and that 
they were judging inventions too stringently.168 In the battle against 
“illiberal” “scientific men,” the patent commissioner and examiners 
again helped shape what patents were and the purposes of the patent 
system.169 
Among congressmen and the first patent commissioners, there was 
initial broad support for examiners to be highly qualified, scientifically 
trained men, men whose credentials were as elite as those of Jefferson 
and Thornton. Ruggles reiterated the “rare” qualifications needed after 
the new system had been in effect for six months (and after Ruggles 
had received his own patent): 
 
the United States, 15 J. Econ. Persps. 233, 239 (2001) (arguing that an 
increase in patent assignments demonstrated increased market value). 
162. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4. 
163. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 29. 
164. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 3. 
165. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 27. 
166. Id. at 34. 
167. For more on Munn & Co. and the Scientific American, see Michael Borut, 
The Scientific American in Nineteenth Century America 135–36 (Apr. 15, 
1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (ProQuest). 
168. Although the debate was not phrased in this way at the time, it can be 
viewed as an argument over the “person skilled in the art,” Patent Act of 
1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836), insofar as the 
“scientific men” were charged with using the wrong standard to review 
applications, by using their elite knowledge rather than that of an artisan, 
that is, one skilled in the art.  
169. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 40, 42. 
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An efficient and just discharge of the duties, it is obvious, requires 
extensive scientific attainments, and a general knowledge of the 
arts, manufactures, and the mechanism used in every branch of 
business in which improvements are sought to be patented, and 
of the principles embraced in the ten thousand inventions 
patented in the United States, and of the thirty thousand 
patented in Europe.170 
As Congress expanded the number of examiner positions, applicants 
sought to win the coveted jobs by soliciting recommendations from 
scientific elites testifying to their qualifications.171 Edmund Burke, who 
became commissioner in 1846, claimed that “[t]he great body of the 
enlightened inventors of this country . . . desire earnestly that the men 
who are to pass upon their valuable rights shall be not only men of 
integrity, but of the highest order of talents and scientific 
qualifications.”172 Into the 1850s, the examiners were men of high 
attainment, separated in their knowledge and formal education from 
inventors, who usually lacked formal technical training.173 Inventors 
might be “all descriptions of persons,” but examiners were not.174 When 
applying for a patent, the Jacksonian common man met rare men in 
the Patent Office, men who sat in judgment on each application and 
might reject it based on information written in a language the applicant 
could not read. 
As patent allowance rates continued to drop, Burke might have 
been engaging in wishful thinking when he asserted that the majority 
of inventors were happy with this hiring policy. The Scientific Amer–
ican reported on personnel changes of Commissioners and examiners 
and frequently commented on the qualifications and performance of 
 
170. S. Comm. Rep. No. 24-58, at 6 (2d Sess. 1837). Ruggles received the first 
patent under the 1836 act. U.S. Patent No. 1 (July 13, 1836). For the 
qualifications of examiners appointed by Ellsworth and his successors, Post, 
“Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 31–33. 
171. For example, Titian Peale obtained recommendations from Joseph Henry 
and Alexander Dulles Bache, two of the preeminent men of science of the 
day. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 41. For expansion of examiner 
positions, see Swanson, supra note 4, at 52. 
172. Edmund Burke, Report of the Commissioner of Patents, H.R. 
Doc. No. 29-140, at 5 (1st Sess. 1846); see also speech by Congressman 
Dickinson, Debate on a Bill to Increase Force and Salaries in the Patent 
Office, 1 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 588, 594 (1919) (reprinting the debates as 
excerpted from the Congressional Globe). 
173. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 31–33, 37–39, 47–48 (qualifications 
of examiners); Khan, supra note 10, at 126 (demographics of patentees). 
174. “All descriptions of persons” did not, for the most part, include white 
women or persons of color. See Swanson, supra note 11. 
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each.175 The “scientific men” in the Patent Office were collectively 
blamed for perpetrating injustice on honest inventors through too 
frequent denials, with some individual examiners derided as especially 
“illiberal,” that is, too apt to misuse their expertise to refuse patents 
for inventions that any mechanically minded man would find novel.176 
Critics accused the “scientific men” of exercising unfettered discretion, 
not sufficiently “regulated and guarded.”177 With only a handful of 
examiners, the Scientific American through its large patent agency 
would have been able to collect experiences with each. In its pages, it 
noted the difference in allowance rates among examiners to prove 
unlawful discretion.178 A rejection, one disappointed patent solicitor 
charged, was the result of the “will and whim of individuals,” tipping 
patents back toward royal privileges rather than rights accessible to 
all.179 
Henry Renwick, an examiner with engineering training from 
Columbia College, sought to counter this perception by explaining in 
1850 how he and his colleagues sought to “aid[] and assist[] [the 
inventor], as far as possible, to cover every inch of ground to which he 
has clear title.”180 Yet Renwick also stressed that “the duties that this 
office . . . owes to the public” required that only those “who have 
contributed to the arts” receive patents and that no “monopol[ies]” 
could be granted except for things “new and useful [and] heretofore 
undescribed.”181 Repeating Thornton and Ruggles’ argument, Renwick 
reminded readers that avoiding invalid patents would also benefit 
patentees, for “when the deed for that title is granted,” cautious 
examination of subsequent applications would ensure that a patentee 
 
175. The multiple Scientific American articles on the Patent Office during this 
period are summarized and cited in Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 
39–46 (also citing attention to patent office personnel decisions in American 
Polytechnic Journal (1853-54) and the general interest New York Tribune). 
176. Id. at 24 (citing Scientific American, Jan. 3, 1857). 
177. John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and 
Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4 (1st Sess. 
1835). 
178. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 50. 
179. Charles G. Page, The Patent Office—No. V, 1 Am. Polytechnic J. 327, 
328 (1853). Page, a former patent examiner, left the office and went into 
business as a patent agent. Post, Physics, Patents, and Politics, 
supra note 6, at 137. 
180. H. B. Renwick, Report, in Thomas Ewbank, Report of the 
Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1850, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 
31-32, at 325 (2d. Sess. 1851); see also Post, Physics, Patents, and 
Politics, supra note 6, at 116–17, 127 (detailing Renwick’s credentials and 
the attacks on him). 
181. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 31-32, at 324–25. 
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“is not harassed and ruined by the grant of other titles.”182 In some 
exasperation, Renwick stated: “it is a common misapprehension . . . to 
suppose this office is established . . . to afford facilities to . . . every 
person who may find it convenient to make application for patent.”183 
Mixing real property analogies with the specter of harmful monopolies, 
Renwick struggled to justify his actions as examiner and explain the 
nature of the rights he and his colleagues created by suggesting that 
the examiners owed “duties” to the public as well as to each applicant. 
Albeit in a context very different from Jefferson, a wealthy property 
owner serving as Secretary of State, Renwick, a bureaucrat dependent 
on a government job to support himself, articulated a duty to guard 
the public against unwarranted monopolies. This re-articulation of the 
public purpose of the patent system was now presented as in balance 
with a Thornton-like concern with each inventor, who needed to be 
aided and freed from harassment. 
Renwick and his fellow bureaucrats found their assertion of the 
joint purposes of the patent system a tough sell. Their critics focused 
only on inventor rights and the need to protect them not from the 
rapacious public Thornton had feared, but rather from the patent 
administrators themselves. The proposed solution was to replace the 
rare men of science with common men as examiners who would, it was 
argued, exercise their discretion more properly, that is, less often.184 
During the tenure of Charles Mason as Commissioner of Patents from 
1853 to 1857, this approach to personnel gained a powerful ally in 
Secretary of Interior Robert McClelland, Mason’s supervisor.185 
McClelland sought control of Patent Office hiring to expand his 
patronage network. 
In Washington of the 1850s, the “spoils system” of awarding 
government jobs to political allies was firmly entrenched, supported by 
a powerful blend of raw political self-interest and high-minded 
Jacksonian philosophy advocating government by the common man and 
rotation in office.186 With McClelland’s goal of awarding Patent Office 
 
182. Id. at 325. 
183. Id. at 324.  
184. Post, Physics, Patents, and Politics, supra note 6, at 120–21. 
185. Mason’s tenure is chronicled in Dobyns, supra note 4, at 189–97; Leila 
Sellers, Commissioner Mason and Clara Barton, 22 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 
803 (1940); and N.J. Brumbaugh, Charles Mason, Commissioner of 
Patents, 1853–57, 2 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 122 (1919). Note that the Patent 
Office had been transferred from the State Department to the newly created 
Department of Interior by the Act of March 3, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395 (1849) 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1451). 
186. Martha Barris Taylor, History of the Federal Civil Service, 
1789 to the Present 16–31 (1941); Paul P. Van Riper, History of 
the United States Civil Service 41–42 (1958); Robert Maranto & 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Making Patents 
812 
jobs to build his party connections aligned with the goal of the inventive 
community to hire less scientifically-minded examiners in order to 
increase the rate of application acceptance, Mason fought a losing battle 
to hire and retain scientific men, resigning twice in disgust over 
McClelland’s interference with personnel decisions.187 When Mason left 
the office for good with a change in presidential administration in 1857, 
his successor fired most of the examiners, replacing them with some of 
the non-scientific men clamoring for federal jobs, and patent allowance 
rates rose.188 The examiner became one of the multitude, rather than 
one of the elite. 
Mason’s replacement as Commissioner, Joseph Holt, who himself 
received the position as a political reward,189 described the new state of 
affairs in 1858: 
This . . . admirable system . . . wisely avoids the laxity of 
European laws, which grant patents, as of course, on all 
applications, upon payment of the fees, and leave their value to 
be subsequently tested by the impoverishing process of protracted 
litigation. As decidedly, on the other hand, does it eschew that 
stern, unsympathizing, distrusting temper, which would receive 
the inventor as a stranger beneath the roof of this magnificent 
edifice . . . . [T]he happy medium between these two equally 
pernicious extremes . . . [that] welcom[es] the inventor as a friend 
and patron, in that frank and free conference with him enjoined 
by law, [and] kindly and anxiously sifts from his invention its 
minutest patentable features, is a policy essentially American in 
its origin and aims, and must be inflexibly maintained . . . .190 
Holt lauded the “inherent and irrepressible energy of the national 
mind” that was bringing ever more applications to the Patent Office as 
the nation industrialized.191 When these irrepressibly inventive 
Americans came to their Patent Office, the examiners avoided both the 
Scylla of “impoverishing” litigation that resulted from the absence of 
ex ante review and the Charybdis of “stern, unsympathizing, distrust–
ing” examination by an illiberal elite that might deny a patent to a true 
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Service 18, 29–31 (1991). 
187. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 193, 197; Sellers, supra note 185, at 823, 825. 
188. See Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 48–50, 52. 
189. Biographical Sketches of the Commissioners of Patents, 18 J. Pat. Off. 
Soc’y 145, 156 (1936). 
190. Joseph Holt, Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the 
Year 1857, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35-32, at 2 (1st Sess. 1858). 
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inventor.192 As a “friend,” the examiner now processed applications in 
a “kindly” way with the goal of finding the “minutest patentable 
features.”193 The examiner no longer was superior to the inventor by 
rare attainments. Instead, it was the inventor who was the “patron” of 
the examiner, whose job it was to work for inventors.194 
By 1860, then, via hiring practices, the day-to-day work of 
examiners had been adjusted by reconfiguring the who rather than the 
how. The result was a combination of perception (non-elite kindly 
examiners) and reality (a rise in patent allowance rates) that promoted 
patents as accessible rights rather special privileges. The equalization 
of inventors and examiners as members of the inherently inventive 
public allowed patents to remain an “admirable” and “essentially 
American” good in an era of the triumph of universality and access–
ibility as key democratic virtues.195 By careful attention to “patentable 
features” and rising allowance rates, Holt considered his office to be 
supporting “a movement in the direction of the highest type of 
civilization,” the progress of the useful arts that would relieve “the 
masses of mankind . . . from the pressures of ceaseless toil.”196 Careful 
protection of individual inventor rights would result in cumulative 
social benefit. 
Holt also highlighted the way his staff worked to implement their 
mandate. Since the passage of the 1836 Act, the examiners had been 
developing the process of what today is known as prosecution, now 
formalized through “office actions” and the back-and-forth of claim 
rejection, cancellation, and amendment.197 They had the statutory 
authority, in addition to rejecting applications outright for lack of nov–
elty, to suggest that an applicant “alter[] his specification to embrace 
only that part of the invention . . . which is new.”198 Holt emphasized 
that examiners “anxiously” worked to identify even the “minutest 
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193. Id.  
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 2–3. 
197. Responding to Office Actions, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., https:// 
www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/responding-office-actions 
[https://perma.cc/E8V7-L5GE] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (“An Office 
action is written correspondence from the patent examiner that requires a 
properly signed written response from the applicant in order for prosecution 
of the application to continue”). See generally Manual of Patent 
Examination Procedure, supra note 33 (detailing the current process of 
patent prosecution). 
198. Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20 (1836). 
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patentable features” in otherwise non-novel inventions.199 This approach 
greatly increased the chance that anyone who found it “convenient” to 
apply for a patent could receive one.200 Like the actions of earlier 
bureaucrats, this generous interpretation of the legislative mandate 
would shape the patent law, this time by modification rather than 
ratification. After the Civil War, courts developed the “invention” 
doctrine, now known as non-obviousness, to limit patents on technically 
trivial inventions, requiring examiners to be a little less kind as they 
combed an application looking for patentable features.201 
Conclusion 
As the subsequent development of the invention doctrine 
demonstrates, the patent system, including its bureaucracy, continued 
to evolve after 1860. The triumph of the spoils system in Patent Office 
hiring was not the final chapter in patent administration, any more 
than the Patent Act of 1836 was the final legislative guidance.202 The 
solutions that McClelland and Holt chose—hiring based on political 
patronage and an examination process geared toward to finding 
something patentable in as many applications as possible—both 
changed after the Civil War. While it was the judiciary that imposed 
the requirement that inventions be non-obvious, it was patent 
commiss–ioners who returned to hiring based on technical expertise.203  
These new approaches, however, did not reignite tensions about ex 
ante review in the Patent Office. The perception that examiners 
 
199. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35-32, at 2. 
200. H. B. Renwick, Report, in Thomas Ewbank, Report of the Commiss–
ioner of Patents for the Year 1850, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 31-32, at 
324 (2d. Sess. 1851). 
201. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 227–29 (noting that although 
the concept was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1850 in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood, it did not become significant until later). 
202. The contours of the examination system created in 1836 have remained 
through wholesale reenactments of the patent law in 1870 and 1952, as 
well as a major revision in 2011. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§2, 31, 16 
Stat. 198, 198, 202 (1870); Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, §§ 131–35, 66 
Stat. 792, 801–02 (1952); America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, 313–15 (2011). 
203. Note that in 1952, the non-obviousness doctrine was ratified by Congress 
(Patent Act of 1952 §103), and the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed 
that section 103 encompassed the previous decades of case law on the 
topic. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966). Note also that in 
1870, Congress mandated that examiners-in-chief (although not the three 
lesser grades) should be “persons of competent legal knowledge and 
scientific ability.” Patent Act of 1870 §10. See also Patent Act of 1952 
§7. 
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remained appropriately guarded and regulated was aided by the ever-
increasing size of the examining corps, a legislative response to a steady 
increase in applications.204 The Patent Act of 1870 authorized almost 
70 people in a proliferating range of examining positions.205 It thus 
became more difficult for those outside the office to follow hiring 
decisions and compare individual allowance rates. With less public 
scrutiny, commissioners experimented with the first merit-based hiring 
practices within the federal civil service, implementing exams beginning 
in 1868 to test technical knowledge.206 These tests, a commissioner 
claimed, allowed self-taught “persons having that natural interest in 
mechanism” as well as those formally educated to compete for examiner 
jobs.207 Further, by 1878, the commissioner described a fifty-seven step 
process which detailed the movement of a patent application through 
the office, from the draftsmen, who examined the drawings for statutory 
conformance, to the clerks for recording filing dates and fees, to the 
examiners for substantive review, and round again, accumulating 
paperwork and notations at each step until the patent was ready for 
issuance.208 This process, published in the annual report to Congress, 
suggested procedural guards and regulations on the discretion of patent 
 
204. U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, supra note 90 
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Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1869, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 
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and results); Samuel A. Duncan, Report of the Commissioner of 
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207. Ellis Spear, Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the Year 
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bureaucrats, making their decisions a result of the uniform application 
of general principles rather than “will and whim.”209 While quietly 
wielding expertise to judge the substance of applications, the Patent 
Office bureaucrats did their best to standardize themselves and their 
practices and to convince the public of their standardization.  
The mid-nineteenth-century “injustice” of individual men, with 
publicly reported histories and personal proclivities, gave way to a 
faceless mass of examiners, operating by a rote process, invisible within 
a virtuous dullness.210 Because of these negotiated approaches to hiring 
and procedure, throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first, patent administration has seemed a “grey, technical realm.”211 The 
delicate balance enacted via kindly attention to inventors resulting in 
the liberal dispersal of individual exclusive rights as a means of serving 
the public has been aided by twentieth-century judicial decisions 
repeatedly suggesting that the office lacks the discretion to consider 
sweeping issues of the public good.212 
In restoring the patent bureaucracy to the antebellum history of 
patents, this Essay provides a historical context for present-day contro–
versies about the nature and purpose of patents.213 I have described the  
209. Page, supra note 179, at 328. 
210. John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and 
Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4 (1st Sess. 
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the “legalization” of patent prosecution, leading to patents becoming 
“formal, textual artifacts”). 
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a question of potential harm from such organisms is a question for Congress, 
but irrelevant to interpreting the doctrine of patentable subject matter); 
see also Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The 
Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 Md. L. Rev. 1051 
(1988); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising 
from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 282–85 (2000) 
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Sherman, The Ethics of Patenting: Towards a Transgenic Patent System, 
3 Med. L. Rev. 275, 275–76 (1995) (noting that neutrality of patent law 
in US and elsewhere was being challenged by calls to consider ethics of 
biotechnology); Shobita Parthasarathy, Patent Politics: Life 
Forms, Markets & the Public Interest in United States & Europe 
2, 13-14, 22 (2017)(noting that in US, “the inventor’s interest . . . was the 
public interest”).  
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century and tying this history to twenty-first century debates about 
patenting life forms). 
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seventy-year effort to embody and enact ex ante review of patent 
applications in a way that was tolerable to bureaucrats, inventors, and 
commercializers alike. Drama requiring presidential intervention, 
attorney general opinions, and newspaper campaigns was sparked by—
and ultimately quelled by—patent administrators. In deciding how to 
implement legislative mandates and in their embodiment both of state 
power and technical expertise, bureaucrats influenced how patents were 
perceived and the relative role of inventors and the public as benefic–
iaries of the patent system. Although this Essay does not develop all 
we can learn from the clerk’s eye view, the history it surveys offers a 
few suggestions. 
One is that muddiness might offer some clarity. In the muddiness 
of daily practical detail, patent administrators did not experience their 
work as offering binary choices between privilege vs. right and/or public 
good vs. individual benefit. Rather, administrators experienced these 
views of patents and their purposes in the form of countervailing 
tendencies about the exercise of discretion and beneficiaries of their 
actions. Much of the time, in their actions, administrators emphasized 
true inventors’ rights and benefits, trends shaped by the nature of 
administration itself.214 To the patent clerk, the customers—inventors—
were more present and more important than an amorphous public or 
constitutional expressions of purpose. Considering the muddiness of 
motivations guiding those who made patents suggests that using such 
binaries as analytic frames can obscure as well as clarify, over–
emphasizing oppositional aspects and underappreciating the continued 
mixed motivations that drove making and using patents. 
The second suggestion is that discretion is always present; it is the 
means of talking about it that change. While the early wild pendulum 
swings in both the degree and celebration of administrator discretion 
have been replaced by a statutorily defined happy medium of neither 
too much nor too little, no amount of procedure, hiring tests, or 
expertise can remove will and whim.215 Rather, recent studies have 
shown that examiners perform their duties differently, for example, 
based on the perceived gender of applicants and their hopes for future 
employment with the law firm representing an applicant.216 
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analyzing the Patent Office as subject to “a type of [regulatory] capture by 
the patent bar”). See also sources cited supra note 14 (discussion of regu–
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As the gray, technical realm becomes newly visible with the release 
of patent application processing metrics on a (anonymized) per 
examiner basis, there is now renewed scrutiny of the who and how of 
the patent bureaucrat. This scrutiny is crucially needed to inform 
possible corrections of the patent system as we weigh our theories of 
the nature and purpose of patents against the realities of application 
processing.217 Bureaucrats matter. 
 
Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners 3, 19 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24638, 2018) (finding 
that examiners grant more patents to firms that later hire them). 
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